The Domains
Shifting Domains
What "domains" means on this site. A domain is a distinct arena where people, organisations, and states operate, compete, and build advantage. Each domain has its own signals, access points, constraints, and forms of leverage.
In modern competition, a single campaign can move across domains quickly. What begins as attention shaping in the information domain can become reputational pressure in the social domain, then legal pressure, then physical risk. Protection fails when risk is assessed in one domain while the threat is unfolding in another.
“Shifting domains” describes how influence and threat migrate across arenas faster than teams, policies, and institutions can keep up.
Domains are arenas, not “types of warfare”
A domain answers: where does activity occur, and what assets, rules, and signals define that arena?
“Warfare” describes how tools are applied and to what effect. For example:
- Cyberspace is a domain
- Cyber warfare is a mode of conflict conducted in that domain
- Information warfare operates through information flows and systems
- Cognitive warfare targets cognition as an effect space and is sometimes described as operating in a cognitive domain (act.nato.int)
On this site:
- Domains are arenas you can map and monitor
- Modes (information, psychological, cognitive) describe mechanisms and effects that can operate across domains
The Domains
Physical domain
Bodies, places, movement, proximity, access control, surveillance, and violence. This is where protection is most visible, but it is often not where campaigns begin.
Digital and technical domain
The engineered systems that mediate modern life: platforms, apps, device ecosystems, AI systems, data supply chains, ad tech, and surveillance tooling.
Cyber domain
A subdomain of digital and technical focused on networks, infrastructure, vulnerabilities, intrusion, disruption, persistence, and data theft. Cyber is the access layer and disruption layer inside the wider technical domain.
Information domain
Content, media ecosystems, channels, reach, amplification, and information integrity. This is where narratives propagate and where information disorder spreads at speed. (edoc.coe.int)
Cognitive domain
Perception, attention, trust, sense-making, and decision-making. NATO ACT frames cognitive warfare as a challenge tied to resilience and decision advantage. (act.nato.int)
Psychological domain
Emotions, morale, motivation, cohesion, fear, and willingness to act. Psychological effects often bridge between exposure (information) and behaviour (action).
Social and cultural domain
Identity, belonging, norms, reputation, status, community networks, informal power, and perceived legitimacy. This is a high-trust carrier domain: people outsource judgment to group cues.
Political and diplomatic domain
Institutions, alliances, political legitimacy, negotiation, signalling, and elite decision-making. This is where influence turns into policy outcomes and strategic alignment.
Legal and regulatory domain
Lawfare, compliance pressure, investigations, litigation, sanctions regimes, and regulatory pressure. This domain can constrain, distract, delegitimise, or financially drain an opponent.
Economic and financial domain
Capital flows, markets, trade dependencies, supply chains, sponsorship, and incentives. Economic leverage often makes effects in other domains “stick”.
How domains shift in real life
A typical cross-domain sequence looks like this:
- A narrative is seeded in the information domain
- It becomes social proof in the social and cultural domain
- It produces psychological effects (fear, anger, grievance, certainty)
- It reshapes cognitive frames (trust, salience, what seems “true” or “inevitable”)
- It triggers legal, economic, or political moves
- It creates physical world constraints or risk
What this means for protection work
Protection is cross-domain, even if teams are not
Most structures are domain-bounded: physical security, cyber, comms, legal, intelligence. Modern threats are cross-domain. The job becomes tracking migration early enough to respond with the right tools in the right domain.
The platform layer is part of the threat surface
Platforms do not just distribute content. They shape salience, social proof, and perceived legitimacy at scale.
Narrative is an operating layer
Narrative is not decoration. It is a mechanism that makes facts feel like stakes and identity, which is why it is central to influence and escalation across domains.
References
Cognitive domain and cognitive warfare
- NATO ACT: Cognitive Warfare (activities page)
https://www.act.nato.int/activities/cognitive-warfare/ - NATO ACT: Cognitive Warfare: Strengthening and Defending the Mind (5 Apr 2023)
https://www.act.nato.int/article/cognitive-warfare-strengthening-and-defending-the-mind/ - NATO ACT: Cognitive Warfare Beyond Military Information Support Operations (9 May 2023)
https://www.act.nato.int/article/cognitive-warfare-beyond-military-information-support-operations/ - NATO ACT: Allied Command Transformation develops the Cognitive Warfare Concept (3 Jul 2024)
https://www.act.nato.int/article/cogwar-concept/ - Liang, Qiao, and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. 1999.
- Naganuma, Kazumi. “Warfare in the Cognitive Domain: Narrative, Emotionality, and Temporality.” NIDS Commentary No. 163. 2021.
- Krishnan, Armin. “Fifth Generation Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, and Gray Zone Conflict: A Comparison.” Journal of Strategic Security 15, no. 4. 2022.
Political warfare and strategy
- Clingendael: The Return of Political Warfare (Strategic Monitor 2018–2019)
https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/strategic-monitor-2018-2019/the-return-of-political-warfare/
Information disorder terminology
- Council of Europe: Wardle & Derakhshan, Information Disorder (2017)
https://edoc.coe.int/en/media/7495-information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research-and-policy-making.html - European Commission: Tackling online disinformation (definitions of disinformation and misinformation)
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformation
Project research
- B.J.F. Rifesser: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Weaponisation of TikTok (MSc thesis, Liverpool John Moores University 2023)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373824227_An_Interdisciplinary_Analysis_of_the_Weaponisation_of_TikTok